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MINORITY VOTE DILUTION IN THE AGE OF OBAMA
Dale Ho *
INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom after the 2012 presidential election is
that Barack Obama won re-election by riding a wave of surging
minority voting power.' Exit polls conducted by the Pew Research
Center indicated that non-white voters made up 28% of all voters,2 up from the previous record high3 of 26% during the 2008
presidential election.4 President Obama won decisive majorities
among minority voters, winning 80% of non-white voters overall.5
Although some of the record turnout among minority voters
during the 2012 presidential election may be attributed to ongoing excitement about the first non-white president in American

*
Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. J.D., 2005,
Yale Law School; A.B., 1999, Princeton University
1. See, e.g., Thomas Beaumont, 2012 Votes Tilt for Obama Like 2008, THE STAR
PHOENIX, Nov. 8, 2012, at C4; Allysia Finley, The GOP's Minority Rapport, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/articlelSB10001424127887324469304578143600668
081108.html ("Obama won by running up his margins among minority voters, which offset
his decline in support among whites.").
2. Changing Face of America Helps Assure Obama Victory, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 7. 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/07/changing-face-of-america-helpsassure-ob ama-victory/.
3. See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY: CONFRONTING
MODERN BARRIERS TO VOTING 7 (2011) (citing MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., DISSECTING THE 2008 ELECTORATE: MOST DIVERSE IN U.S. HISTORY 1
(2009)), available at http://naacp.3cdn.net/67065c25be9ae43367_mlbrsy48b.pdf.
4. See ChangingFace of America Helps Assure Obama Victory, supranote 2. Turnout
among minority voters appears to have been particularly critical in closely contested battleground states: in Ohio, African Americans were 15% of all voters, significantly up from
11% in 2008, while in Florida, Latinos were 17% of all voters, up from 14% in 2008. Id.
5. Id. Obama won over 90% of African American voters and 70% of Latino and Asian
American voters, improving on his margins among those two groups from his showing in
2008. Id.; see Susan Page, A Nation Moving FurtherApart, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2012, at
Al. Compare 2012 Fox News Exit Polls, FOxNEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/politicselect
ionsI2012-exit-poll (last visited Feb. 18, 2013), with Fox News Exit Poll: Results for the
2008 GeneralElection, FOxNEWS, http:// www.foxnews.comlpolitics/elections/2008-ey-it-poll
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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history, that enthusiasm cannot tell the whole story, which is only clear in light of the substantial demographic changes that the
country has undergone in recent years.' It is a banal truism to observe that the country is becoming more diverse, but the results
of the 2012 election seem to have validated earlier predictions
that minority voters will exercise ever greater influence on Election Day.7
Indeed, some viewed Obama's advantages among minority
groups as outcome-determinative, overwhelming economic factors
that are usually considered decisive in presidential elections.8
Strikingly, Mitt Romney will go down in history as the candidate
who "won the biggest majority of the white vote of any presidential candidate in U.S. history who then failed to win the White

6. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 1; Paul Taylor & DVera Cohn, A Milestone En Route
to a Majority Minority Nation, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/2012/1 1/07/a-milestone-en-route-to-a-majority-minority-nation/.
7. See, e.g., William H. Frey, Why Minorities Will Decide the 2012 U.S. Election,
BROOKINGS INST. (May 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/researchlopinions/2012/05/01-ra
ce-elections-frey. As early as 2002, John Judis and Ruy Teixeira predicted that demographic changes would be decisive in electoral outcomes. See JOHN B. JUDIs & RUY
TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 35 (2002).
8. See Thomas Fitzgerald, PresidentObama Wins Reelection, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov.
7, 2012, at A01 (noting that no incumbent had been reelected since Franklin Delano Roosevelt with an unemployment rate higher than 7.2%); Dick Morris, Dick Morris ExplainsWhy I Was Wrong About The 2012 Election,FOxNEWS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.foxnews.
com/opinion/2012/11/07/dick-morris-explains-why-was-wrong-about-2012-election/
('This
is not your father's United States and the Republican tilt toward white middle aged and
older voters is ghettoizing the party so that even bad economic times are not enough to
sway the election."). In the aftermath of the election, a number of commentators have argued that, given that minority voters will only become a larger share of the electorate in
the future, the Republican Party will not find success in future presidential elections unless it finds a way to reduce margins among minority voters. See, e.g., Beaumont, supra
note 1 ('The outcome revealed a stark problem for Republicans: If they don't broaden their
tent, they won't move forward.'); Finley, supra note 1 ("[Given the] demographic headwinds Republicans face .... [t]he grim news for Republicans is that the strong minority
turnout this year wasn't an aberration."); Neil King, Jr. & Victoria McGrane, Activists
Urge New GOP Tone, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2012, at A5 ("Mr. Romney's lopsided loss
among the country's expanding universe of minority voters has fanned fears within the
party that its main challenge is demographic, though others dismiss that worry as secondary."); Kenneth Warren, Republicans Must Adjust To ChangingDemographics, ST. LouiS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 2012, at A19 ("A close look at demographical and electoral trends
makes it clear that the 2012 election loss by the Republicans was no fluke, but indicative
of a bleak electoral future for the Republican Party unless Republicans make quick adjustments to appeal to minorities, women and younger voters.").
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House."9 Conservative pundit Bill O'Reilly thus exclaimed on election night that "[t]he white establishment is now the minority."1
Leaving such hyperbole aside-after all, Obama would have
lost in a landslide had he done as poorly with white voters as
Romney did with minority voters"-it is undoubtedly true that
minority voters are participating in the political process in record
and increasing numbers. Given what appears to be unprecedented political strength, it is fair to ask whether minority voters continue to need certain protections-in particular, those protections
aimed at preventing voting laws that, rather than block access to
the ballot, weaken or dilute the weight of the ballots cast by minority voters.
Indeed, in recent years, legal commentators on both the right 2
and the left13 have argued that protections against minority vote
dilution may no longer be necessary. Even some commentators
who support continuing protections against minority vote dilution
have acknowledged that recent growth in minority political power
has called into question the need for majority-minority districting
as a remedy to claims of minority vote dilution.'4 The question,

9. Page, supra note 5.Romney won white voters 59% to 39%-improving on John
McCain's showing by four percentage points. See Changing Face of America Helps Assure
Obama Victory, supranote 2.
10. Bill O'Reilly: 'The White Establishment Is Now the Minority, FoXNATION (Nov. 7,
2012), http://nation.foxnews.com/bill-oreilly/2012/11/07bill-o-reilly-white-establishment-no
w-minority.
11. Moreover, many different demographic groups could each lay credible claims to
having played a decisive role in the election. See, e.g., Micah Cohen, Gay Vote Seen as Crucial in Obama's Victory, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 15, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://fivethirtyeig
ht.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/l 1/15/gay-vote-seen-as-crucial-in-obamas-victory/ (arguing that
"the backing Mr. Obama received from gay voters also has a claim on having been decisive"); Sam Go, Women's Vote Played Crucial Role In Obama Victory, MSNBC (Nov. 6,
2012, 11:30 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2012/11/06/exit-poll-women-play-crucial-role-inpossible-obama-victory/ (arguing that "[tihe women's vote propelled Barack Obama to victory"); Joe Green, The Youth Vote was Crucial to Obama's 2012 Victory, AMERICABLOG
(Nov. 26, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://americablog.com/2012/11/obama-youth-vote-2012.html
(observing that "if no one under the age of 30 had voted, the electoral votes of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Florida, and therefore the Electoral College, would have swung to
Romney").
12. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting in Today's Shifting Racial Landscape,
23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 381-83 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Section 2 is Dead: Long Live Section. 2,
160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219, 223, 226 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com
respnses/1-2012/Charles.pdf
14. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes,
UnconstitutionalElections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 456 (2012)
(describing the need to "resuscitate" the prohibition on vote dilution in Section 2 of the
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put in stark relief by the consecutive successes of an African
American candidate to prevail in the largest majority-white district in the country (i.e., the electoral college) is whether minority
political participation has reached a critical mass such that the
practice of drawing majority-minority districts to afford minority
voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice is no
longer necessary.
My goal in this article is to identify several factors suggesting
that reports of the demise of minority vote dilution doctrine-and
the remedy of majority-minority districting-are premature. This
article proceeds in three parts. First, I will provide a brief overview of minority vote dilution doctrine and recent criticisms of it
in light of growing minority political power. Second, I will offer
some observations that may undermine some of the premises of
these criticisms. Third, I will briefly address some factors that are
indicative of whether, as a general matter, robust protections
against minority vote dilution remain necessary today.
Ultimately, it is undoubtedly true that racial polarization-the
phenomenon in which white and minority voters vote cohesively
within their own respective groups but differently from each other-has receded in some parts of the country, which may make
the remedy of majority-minority districting unnecessary under
some circumstances. But if racial polarization is on the decline in
some places, it is equally true that racial polarization-severe racial polarization-remains stubbornly persistent or is even on the
rise in others. In places where we continue to sort ourselves along
racial lines on a de facto basis, accusations that majority-minority
districting only divides us ring hollow. Rather, in areas where
voting is so racially polarized that minority voters can always be
outvoted by the majority and effectively shut out of the political
process, the remedy of majority-minority districting remains an
indispensable mechanism of affording minority voters with an
opportunity to cast a meaningful vote.

VRA); Benjamin E. Griffith, Redistricting Woes After the 2010 Census: Statistical Estimates, Inclusion of College Students and Prisoners, and "Safe" Districts, in AMERICA
VOTES! A GUIDE TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 155, 173 (Benjamin E.
Griffith ed., 2d ed. 2012) ("Even the most dedicated civil rights experts and litigators agree
But the issue of
that we are moving toward a more open and equal Democratic process ....
the continued viability of and need for super-majority or 'safe' single-member districts is
not so easily resolved, even in a time that has witnessed the election of the first African
American to the presidency.").
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Furthermore, because the election of minority candidates tends
to reduce racial polarization and promote cross-racial understanding, majority-minority districting in such areas may have
the effect of diminishing, rather than aggravating, racial polarization. If, as Pam Karlan has posited, "[t]he core problem that
voting rights theory and case law must face today is the persistence of permanent racial faction," and "[t]he central task of modern voting rights law must be to control the effects of this polarization,"'5 then the best data available suggests that majorityminority districting remains desirable in many places today. As
always, however, the question of whether majority-minority districting is appropriate will depend on the local circumstances of
each individual case.
I.

MINORITY VOTE DILUTION-THE NEW OLD CRITIQUE

Criticism of minority vote dilution doctrine is hardly new. In
fact, questions concerning the theoretical underpinnings, practical need, and possibly adverse consequences of majority-minority
redistricting have been with us for some time,'6 dating back at
least to 1982, when section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA")
was amended to make it easier to bring claims alleging that an
electoral practice has diluted minority voting power.'" These criticisms have gained added salience in recent years, however, as
minority communities exert ever-increasing influence at the ballot box.
A. The Standardfor Minority Vote Dilution
Before turning to the current critique, it is helpful to briefly review the statutory standard for minority vote dilution claims under the VRA and the concerns animating minority vote dilution
doctrine.

15.

Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.

L. REV. 1705, 1740 (1993).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 37-48.
17. 42 U.S.C. §1973(a) (2006).
18. Section 2 was amended in 1982 to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which limited liability under the statute to cases
where plaintiffs alleged discriminatory intent. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING
RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27-28 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
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Claims of minority vote dilution have been referred to as the
"second generation" of voting rights litigation, 9 to distinguish
them from challenges aimed at removing barriers to the ballot itself. Essentially, the term minority vote dilution refers to situations where minority voters have been "submerge[d]" into a jurisdiction or an election district where, although not deprived of the
right to cast a vote, they are powerless to elect their preferred
candidates because they are always outvoted by a white majority.2" As Heather Gerken has explained succinctly, such claims
typically arise when whites and racial minorities consistently prefer
different candidates at the polls-that is, when voting is "racially polarized." Even in circumstances in which all voters are able to cast
their votes, a state can nonetheless take advantage of this type of
voting pattern to undermine 21the ability of minority group members
to affect the political process.

Vote dilution claims are most commonly brought under section
2 of the VRA. 22 In order to bring a claim for vote dilution under
section 2, plaintiffs must establish three preconditions: (i) that
they are members of a minority group that is sufficiently large so
as to form a majority in a compact, single-member district; (ii)
that members of the minority group are "politically cohesive,"
such that it is accurate to speak in terms of minority-preferred
candidates; and (iii) that voting in the area is racially polarized,
such that the minority group's preferences are generally overwhelmed by white voters.2 3
Once these threshold conditions have been established, plaintiffs can establish liability by proving the presence of a number of

19. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenisim: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093-94 (1991).
20.

Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11 (2009). Schemes to dilute minority voting

power have included methods other than the manipulation of district lines, such as runoff
requirements. Dilution occurs in this instance because a white majority that has split up
among several candidates in the first round of voting may coalesce behind a single candidate in the second round, thereby overwhelming minority voters. See Chandler Davidson,
The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990,

21, 23 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET
REVOLUTION]. For purposes of this essay, however, I will focus on dilutive schemes involving the drawing of district lines.
21. Heather Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1671-72 (2001).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006); see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY 596 (3d ed. 2007).

23.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56-58 (1986).
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additional factors, derived from the Senate report to the 1982
amendments to the VRA.24 The remedy for vote dilution claims is
typically the drawing of a single-member district in which minority voters constitute a majority, so as to be able to elect a candidate of their choice.25
Initially, minority vote dilution claims were most common in
the context of at-large or multi-member electoral arrangements in
which all voters within a particular jurisdiction cast ballots for
multiple members of the governing body. Where voting is racially
polarized, an at-large arrangement for multiple offices can effectively lock out minority voters entirely: "At-large voting schemes
and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength
of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all
representatives of the district."2 Actionable vote dilution can also
occur, however, where the lines in a single-member districting
plan have been drawn in such a way that has the same effect of
isolating minority voters in racially polarized majority white districts, and thus preventing from electing any candidates of their
choice.2 7
Crucially, although proving discriminatory intent is not an element of liability under section 2, the standard for vote dilution
liability is not a simple "effects" test akin to, for example, the disparate impact standard for employment discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28 Rather, as explained below,29 although section 2 speaks in terms of a "results"
test, the factors for establishing a statutory violation are quite

24. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. No. 97417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
25. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1673. Non-district remedies that provide minority
voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, such as cumulative or
ranked-choice voting, are also possible remedies to vote dilution claims. See Lani Guinier,
Groups, Representation,and Race-Conscious Districting:A Case of the Emperor's Clothes,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1595 (1993); Steven J. Mulroy, Nondistrict Vote Dilution Remedies
under the Voting Rights Act, in AMERICA VOTES! A GUIDE TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND
VOTING RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 199, 199; Rob Richie & Andrew Spencer, The Right
Choice for Elections: How Choice Voting Will End Gerrymanderingand Expand Minority
Voting Rights, from City Councils to Congress, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 959, 987-1001 (2013).
26. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
27. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 25-28 (1993).
28. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 984-86 (1988).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
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similar to-and indeed, were largely intended to mimic-the factors for finding a constitutional violation based on intentional discrimination.
B. The Concerns Underpinning Vote Dilution Claims
Although a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of
this brief essay, a few points are instructive concerning the theoretical underpinning of vote dilution claims. Broadly speaking,
vote dilution claims are premised on the notion that the right to
vote does not end with an individual's formal right to cast a ballot. The right also encompasses a collective right to aggregate
one's vote with other like-minded voters, so that one's vote may
have a meaningful effect on election outcomes.3" Individual participation and expression are certainly important elements of the
right to vote, but as Pam Karlan has noted, it is perhaps "[t]he
primary function of voting.., to combine individual preferences
to reach some collective decision, such as the selection of representatives."'"
The Supreme Court's paradigmatic articulation of this notion is
found in Justice Douglas's dissent in South v. Peters,3 which was
subsequently quoted with approval by a majority of the Court in
Reynolds v. Sims:
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of
paper and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever in a voting
booth. The right to vote includes..,
. . .the right
33 to have the vote counted at full value without dilution or discount.

In other words, the right to vote encompasses more than the
formal right to cast a ballot. Even a "mathematically equal vote
which is politically worthless because of gerrymandering or win30. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1677 ("Dilution doctrine rests on two assumptions
about the way representative democracy works: first, that there is more to 'voting' than
merely casting a vote, and second, that members of an electoral minority should enjoy an
equal opportunity to coalesce effectively despite the mandate of majority rule.").
31. Karlan, supra note 15, at 1712; see also Gerken, supra note 21, at 1677-78 (noting
that representative systems assume that the right to vote includes a right to aggregate
one's vote with others such that an individual's best chance of influencing the process is
when acting in concert with others who throw their weight behind a single candidate).
32. 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Saylor,
322 U.S. 385, 386 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 322 (1941); Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884)).

33. 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964) (quoting South, 339 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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as 'emperor's clothes.' 3 4
a collective aggregation
political process by comelect the representatives

Of course, in a winner-take-all system such as ours, not everyone can be afforded such an opportunity in every election, 5 but
there is something intuitively problematic about electoral arrangements that systematically deprive out-groups of any such
opportunity to elect candidates where a simple re-drawing of the
lines could produce electoral results that give both political majorities and minorities a voice that more closely reflects their relative voting strength.
For example, leaving race-based claims aside for a moment, if
we imagine an electorate in which 60% of voters favored one party and 40% another, a districting plan where the lines were
drawn to ensure that all ten seats in a legislature are awarded to
members of the majority party might be viewed as problematic, if
all else being equal, another plan could provide something closer
to a 6-4 split in the legislature. While strict proportionality is not
a command, the closer we come to a correlation between voters'
actual preferences and electoral results, the fewer votes are
"wasted" by not having any weight whatsoever in electoral out36
comes.
Minority vote dilution claims are premised on the notion that,
given our constitutional commitment to prohibit racial discrimination, there is a special injury where members of a racial or ethnic minority are locked out in this manner. Thus, section 2 of the
VRA aims to remedy situations when minority voters, who could
form a majority within a compact single-member district, are instead divided up among multiple districts where they are consistently outvoted and have no say in the political process.

34. ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 22 (1968).
35. See Guinier, supranote 25, at 1592.
36. See Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Systems in the United States, 35 HOus. L. REV. 1119, 1146-47 (1998); cf. JOHN STUART MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 146 (1862) (arguing that representative government should be based on an electoral system that would guarantee that "a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives").
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C. Contemporary Criticismsof Minority Vote DilutionDoctrine;
Or, What's Old Is New Again
1. Two Recent Criticisms of Minority Vote Dilution Doctrine
There has perhaps always been a bit of unease about whether
minority vote dilution is something that with which our civil
rights laws should be concerned. This is partly because vote dilution is inherently a group-based problem, the recognition of which
in some sense runs counter to the liberal individual rights concerns behind many of our constitutional protections. Indeed, the
underlying values that minority vote dilution doctrine seeks to
protect have been and remain subject to intense debate.37 But
leaving those complex and important theoretical questions aside,
there are at least two separate, more practical questions as to
whether protections against minority vote dilution remain necessary today.
First, assuming the theoretical validity of such claims, do we
still-as a purely practical matter--continue to need protections
against minority vote dilution, given the explosive growth of minority political participation and, indeed, political power? As noted, minorities are now participating in the political process in
record numbers." Given this newfound and unprecedented
strength, perhaps minority voters no longer need the advantage
of being a numerical majority within their own districts, where
they are arguably exempt from the "pull, haul, and trade"39 of coalition-building and deal-making that is inherent to politics itself.
Thus, the argument goes, efforts to combat minority vote dilution
amount to little more than a racial quota system for electoral politics,4" which is neither desirable on its own terms nor necessary
for meaningful minority representation today.
Perhaps, some have argued, there is a middle ground in which
we can achieve meaningful representation for minority voters
while at the same time reducing our reliance on majorityminority districting, for instance, by drawing districts that, while
less than majority-minority, may still elect candidates who sup-

37.
38.
39.
40.

See, e.g., Charles, supranote 13, at 221.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
See id.
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port minority-favorable policies. 4' In many places, it may no longer be necessary to draw districts that are majority-minority in order to give minority voters a real opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice, either because there is a small but reliable group
of white voters who are willing to cross over and support minority-preferred candidates or because a group of minority voters,
though not an absolute majority, form a plurality of the voters in
a heterogeneous multiracial district."
Second, is it possible that drawing majority-minority districts
in today's demographic landscape only increases political or even
racial polarization? Because such districts tend to be more leftleaning than the average Democrat district, some commentators
have suggested that the drawing of such districts may bleach surrounding districts of minority influence and may threaten to balkanize us into competing racial factions. 3
2. Back to the Past?
Times have certainly changed in many ways. But what is striking about these purportedly "new" criticisms of minority vote dilution doctrine is how old they in fact are. Although dressed in
new facts, the two concerns described above are not new. In fact,
they have been raised throughout the history of the VRA's engagement with the problem of minority vote dilution.
For example, the argument that minority voters do not need
majority-minority districts in order to elect their preferred candidates and that reliance on such districts amounts to an unnecessary quota has been put forward since the 1980s,44 despite the
fact that "racial polarization l[ed] to the systematic electoral de-

41. See DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 10 (1997).
42. See Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual
Frameworkand Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1389-93 (2001).
43.

See, e.g., CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRSENTATION

OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 205 (1995); Charles Cameron et al., Do MajorityMinority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 794, 808 (1996); Thernstrom, supra note 12, at 374 n.4 ('Mlore Black voters in
some districts meant fewer in others, and, in the South particularly, districts that had
been 'bleached' were fertile ground for Republican political aspirations."). See generally
LUBLIN, supra note 41.
44.

See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 243 (1987); Charles S. Bullock III, Symbolics or Substance:
A Critiqueof the At-Large Election Controversy, 21 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REV. 91, 95 (1989).
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feat of minority candidates of choice" and "there [wa] s very little
evidence to suggest that white bloc voting ha[d] substantially diminished in the South."
The anti-quota argument, however, became a rallying cry during the 1982 debates over the amendments and reauthorization of
the VRA. Chief Justice Roberts, who was then a young Reagan
administration lawyer, argued in various memoranda against
making it easier for plaintiffs to bring vote dilution claims under
section 2 of the VRA, asserting that there was no "need for such a
change," which, in his view, "could also lead to a quota system in
electoral politics."4 6 Minority voters, in other words, had no need
for any protections against vote dilution (other than, presumably,
the basic prohibition on unconstitutional racial discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
In these memoranda, Roberts also argued that amending section 2 to require majority-minority districts would inhibit efforts
to integrate communities across racial lines, for example, by prohibiting annexations of suburbs and the consolidation of school
districts, forcing predominantly minority inner cities to remain
politically divorced from more predominantly white suburbs.4 7
Eleven years later, Justice O'Connor would echo these sentiments
in more abstract terms in Shaw v. Reno, expressing the concern
that race-conscious districting "may balkanize us into competing
racial factions" and "carry us further from the goal of a political
system in which race no longer matters. 48

45. Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second
Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 378, 460-61 n. 19. See generally
Pamela S. Karlan & Peyton McCrary, Without Fear and Without Research: Abigail
Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 J.L. & POLITICS 751 (1988) (reviewing
THERNSTROM, supra note 44).
46. Memorandum from John Roberts to the Attorney General, Talking Points For
White House Meeting on Voting Rights Act (Jan. 26, 1982), available at http://www.ar
chives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/030-black-binder/folderO3O.pdf. In another memorandum, Roberts argued that the amendments "would in essence establish a
'right' in racial and language minorities to electoral representation proportional to their
population in the community," and amount to an improper "basis for the most intrusive
interference imaginable by federal courts into state and local processes." Memorandum
from John Roberts to the Attorney General, Voting Rights Act: Section 2 (Dec. 22, 1981),
available at http://www.archives.gov/newstjohn-robertsaccession-60-88-0498/030-black-bin
derl/folder030.pdf.
47. Memorandum from John Roberts to Brad Reynolds et al., Voting Rights Act: § 2
(Feb. 17, 1982), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-880498/025-voting-rghts-act/folder025.pdf.
48. 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
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These concerns, in other words, do not reflect a radically new
analytic context. Rather, the vote dilution doctrine contended
with these criticisms from its inception. This is not to say that
these criticisms do not raise very serious points, but we would do
well to remember that the debate over minority vote dilution doctrine is a long-standing one and that attention to this history may
be warranted.

II. Two QUESTIONABLE PREMISES
With that observation in mind, it is worth noting that there
seem to be two ideas implicit in these critiques, which are that
districting plans that dilute minority voting power-even those
that do so intentionally-(i) represent a radical break from and
(ii) are qualitatively different from more blunt discriminatory
laws that denied access to the ballot itself. Viewed in this light,
vote dilution is in some sense a lesser form of discrimination than
actual vote denial.
This idea was perhaps made most explicit in Justice Thomas's
opinion in Holder v. Hall, in which he argued that section 2 of the
VRA should not be read to encompass vote dilution claims, which
he viewed as radically distinct-both historically and qualitatively-from vote denial:
The statute was originally perceived as a remedial provision directed
specifically at eradicating discriminatory practices that restricted
blacks' ability to register and vote in the segregated South. Now, the
Act has grown into something entirely different. In construing the
Act to cover claims of vote dilution, we have converted the Act into a
device for regulating, rationini and apportioning political power
among racial and ethnic groups.

This view-that vote dilution was somehow alien to the concerns
that originally animated the VRA-has been echoed repeatedly
by commentators.5 0 What I hope to demonstrate below is that this
view misperceives the history surrounding the enactment of the
VRA and ignores critical strains in voting rights precedent that

49. 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
50. See, e.g., Thernstrom, supra note 12, at 379 ('Today's allegations of electoral exclusion.., are not remotely analogous to the physical and economic danger that Blacks in
the Deep South faced if they tried to register to vote in the years before the passage of the
Voting Rights Act. We now live in an America far removed from that of the Jim Crow
South....").
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reject the notion that the right to vote is limited merely to the
formal right of ballot access.
A. The History of Minority Vote Dilution
The first premise in the standard critique of vote dilution doctrine is that, historically speaking, there was some sort of radical
break between devices employed to deny the vote from minority
voters and those designed to weaken their voting power. Although there is a temptation to view electoral arrangements and
districting plans that dilute minority strength as just another example of the sort of partisan gerrymandering in which the political parties routinely engage, this view misapprehends the struggle for voting rights during and since the era of the civil rights
movement.
Historically, districting plans that diluted minority voting power only came about as a response to minority enfranchisement.
"Whites had used such laws in the nineteenth century both during and after Reconstruction to dilute or curtail the power blacks
had obtained at the ballot box."51 Dilutive schemes were originally
used during and after Reconstruction in order to deprive newly
enfranchised African Americans of any effective voting power.52
Widespread disfranchisement at the end of the nineteenth century rendered such techniques largely unnecessary; after all,
there would be no need to dilute minority voting power when
there were very few registered minority voters to speak of. But
when African American voting power "threatened to become" a
"serious factor" again in the 1960s, once again, "efforts were
mounted throughout the former Confederacy to establish laws
that would dilute minority voting strength."5 3 Such dilutive methods were often "the result of white southern politicians' recognition after World War II that, since black enfranchisement was

51. Davidson, supra note 20, at 22; see also id. at 24.
52. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 15-16 (1999); J. Morgan Kousser, The
Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 27, 32-33 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) [hereinafter Kousser, Lessons for the
Second].
53. Davidson, supra note 20, at 24 (citing Kousser, Lessons for the Second, supra note
52, at 32-33).
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probably inevitable... new means would have to be found to limit black voters' effectiveness.""
Thus, as it became clear that it would soon be impossible to
prevent African Americans from casting ballots altogether, efforts
were once again undertaken to minimize the effectiveness of
those ballots. For example, it was immediately after the Selma to
Montgomery march, which catalyzed national support for the
passage of the VRA," that the Alabama state legislature passed a
bill to require at-large elections, with the sponsor expressly stating that his goal was to restrict the impact of the so-called "block
vote."5 Such efforts were common throughout the South around
the time that the VRA was enacted. 7
Here in Richmond, similar efforts manifested at both the state
and local levels. A year before the VRA was enacted, the Virginia
state legislature enacted redistricting plans that called for: (i) the
election of two state senators from a single at-large district in
Richmond; and (ii) the election of eight members of the House of
Delegates from a single eight-member at-large district that combined the City of Richmond and Henrico County.58 The plan had
its intended effect during the following election cycle in 1965; despite growing African American enfranchisement in Richmond,
no African Americans were elected from Richmond to the Virginia
General Assembly.59
At the local level, Richmond employed a variety of techniques
to try to ensure that African Americans would be unable to elect
any candidates. After African American registration surged from
approximately one-quarter to one-third of voters within Richmond itself, the city responded with a proposal to adopt staggered
terms for the city council, which was intended to prevent African
Americans from pooling their voting power to elect their preferred

54. Id. at 22; see also id. at 26-27.
55. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 263 (2000).
56. Davidson, supranote 20, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia,in QUIET REVOLUTION, supranote 20,
at 67, 67, 82.
58. See Act of Dec. 2, 1964, ch. 2, 1964 Va. Acts 4, 5; Act of Dec. 2, 1964, ch.1, 1964 Va.
Acts 3, 4; Thomas R. Morris & Neil Bradley, Virginia, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note
20, at 271, 280.
59. See Morris & Bradley, supra note 58, at 280.
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candidates." Later, African Americans became a majority in
Richmond during the 1970s. But, in an effort that a district court
determined was a "move by the white political leadership, frightened by the new electoral strength of black voters, to maintain
control of city council,"'" the city sought to annex several surrounding largely white suburbs to reduce the city's African American population to only 42%."
Richmond was no different from a number of places in the
South-as African Americans grew in electoral strength, efforts
were undertaken to try to limit their influence. Thus, as the Supreme Court later explained, shortly after passage of the VRA "it
soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls
would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting
practices.... [to] reduce or nullify minority voters' ability, as a
group, 'to elect the candidate of their choice.' 6 3 But the architects
of the VRA anticipated developments like these and therefore designed the VRA to be a broad, remedial tool to prevent all forms
of racial discrimination in voting.
Today, some litigants-including the plaintiff in Shelby County
v. Holder, a case currently pending before the Supreme Court64
challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA 6 5 -have
contended that the exclusive purpose of the VRA was to ensure
ballot access and nothing more.66 But, in fact, the VRA's section 5

60. Id. at 282. Staggered terms can be used to counteract a "bullet-vote" strategy employed by minority voters in an at-large districting plan. See id. That is, in a multimember at-large setting where all candidates run against each other, with the top votegetters receiving seats, a minority group can sometimes elect their favored candidate, by
"bullet voting" for a single preferred candidate while withholding votes for any other candidate. See Davidson, supra note 20, at 23. Staggered terms are meant to combat this
strategy by ensuring that only one office from a multi-member district is up for election at
a given time, such that the majority can outvote the minority each time. See Morris &
Bradley, supra note 58, at 283.
61. Morris & Bradley, supra note 58, at 283.
62. Id.
63. Shaw v. Reno, 504 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1993) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)).
64. 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted,81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012)
(No. 12-96).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
66. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 489 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing the
plaintiffs argument that section 5 of the VRA was not intended to apply to claims of minority vote dilution).
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"preclearance procedure... was a mechanism designed to prevent recalcitrant white Southerners
' from undermining the effec67
tiveness of black enfranchisement.
Thus, section 5 of the VRA, which requires certain states and
subjurisdictions to obtain prior federal approval ("preclearance")
before implementing changes to their voting laws, expressly applies to "any. . . standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting.""s Section 5 plainly is not limited only to laws that limit
the actual casting of ballots but rather was drafted broadly so
that it could capture any discriminatory voting laws, including
those aimed at diluting minority voting power. Its purpose was to
prevent the adoption of new schemes that prevent minority voters
from exercising political power, not "to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old poison into new bottles. 6 9
Section 5 was originally enacted on a temporary basis and has
been subject to periodic reauthorizations, the most recent of
which was in 2006.70 Starting with the legislative hearings concerning the initial enactment of the VRA, however, Congress
heard testimony concerning not only outright disfranchisement
but also minority vote dilution. 7' The purpose of the VRA was to
combat both problems. As Attorney General Katzenbach subsequently explained during the 1975 reauthorization hearings,
[w]hen we drafted this legislation, we recognized that increased
black voting strength might encourage a shift in the tactics of discrimination. Once significant numbers of blacks could vote, commu-

67. KEYSSAR, supra note 55, at 288 (emphasis added); see also Shelby Cnty., 811 F.
Supp. 2d at 489 ("Section 5 never had such a limited purpose. To the contrary, Congress
specifically designed the preclearance requirement in order to prohibit covered jurisdictions from implementing any and all discriminatory voting changes, regardless of the form
they might take.").
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (emphasis added).
69. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
70. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).

71.

During the original 1965 hearings concerning the VRA, Attorney General Katzen-

bach warned that Southern states could engage in a wide variety of strategies that could
be used for "purposes of evading the 15th Amendment." Hearings On H.R. 6400 and Other

Proposals to Enforce the 15th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 95 (1965) (statement of
Nicholas Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States). Five years later, during the first
reauthorization, the House Report to the reauthorization bill warned that, although minority voter registration rates were on the rise, jurisdictions covered by section 5 "ha[d]
undertaken new, unlawful ways" to discriminate. H.R. REP. No. 91-397, at 7 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277, 3283.
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nities could still throw up obstacles to... make it difficult for a black
to win elective office. .

.

. Section 5 has had its broadest impact ...

in

the areas of redistricting and reapportionment. A substantial majority of the objections have been directed at this type of change.... Objections to this type of change, more than any other, have allowed
blacks to achieve a
greater measure of political selfdetermination... [and] have played such a central role in stimulating black political participation...

Thus, while it is accurate to say that, initially, the VRA was
principally concerned with disfranchisement, it is an overstatement to suggest that disfranchisement was its exclusive target, or
that preventing minority vote dilution was somehow alien to its
initial purpose. In fact, as Katzenbach's testimony makes clear,
preventing minority vote dilution was one purpose of the act. As
dilution schemes quickly became the chief threat to the effective
exercise of the franchise by minority voters, they soon became the
VRA's principal focus.
And, extensive empirical research has demonstrated that the
rise of single-member district voting to replace at-large districting
plans-thanks largely to the VRA-has been responsible for substantial diversification among elected officials in the South. 73 It is
probably not an exaggeration to say that, but for the application
of the VRA to vote dilution schemes, efforts to block minority voters from exercising meaningful political power in the South may
have been successful.

72. Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S.
1409, and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,94th Cong. 123-24. (1975) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the
United States); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 10 (1975) (expressly stating that one

purpose of section 5 was to prevent the use of "at-large elections, annexations of predominantly white areas, or the adoption of discriminatory redistricting plans"). Congress would
also make clear during subsequent reauthorizations that dilutive schemes were one of the
chief rationales for the continuing need for the VRA's expiring provisions. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 97-417, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 187 (finding that "covered

jurisdictions have substantially moved from direct, over[t] impediments to the right to
vote to more sophisticated devices to dilute minority voting strength"); see also H.R. REP.
No. 109-478, at 36 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 640 (justifying the most
recent reauthorization of section 5 based on "voting changes devised by covered jurisdictions [which] resemble those techniques and methods used in 1965, 1970, 1975, and
1982"); id. at 21, reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 631 (noting evidence of "calculated
decisions to keep minority voters from fully participating in the political process").

73. See Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election
Structure on Black Representationin Eight Southern States, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra
note 20, at 301, 313, 319-21; see also Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting

Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 378,
384-87.
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B. The ConstitutionalInjury of Minority Vote Dilution
A second premise in the standard critique of vote dilution doctrine is that vote dilution schemes are somehow less injurious to
a person's right to vote than outright denial of the ballot. In one
obvious sense, this seems to be true. After all, even if we treat the
right to vote not only as an individual's participation right, but
also as the right to aggregate one's vote with others so as to influence election outcomes,"4 a person will always have at least some
chance of doing so successfully, so long as she is not disfranchised
entirely.
As a form of constitutional injury, however, vote dilution
should be understood as being on the same footing as outright
denial of the ballot, for two reasons. First, where dilutive schemes
are motivated by racially discriminatory intent, such schemes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is axiomatic that facially neutral state action motivated by discriminatory racial animus violates the Equal Protection Clause.7 5
This is true even if the same law enacted without such animus
would be otherwise valid. Thus, intentionally discriminatory efforts to dilute the voting power of minority voters are no less odious under the Equal Protection Clause than are intentionally discriminatory efforts to deny access to the ballot.
To be sure, the VRA's prohibitions on minority vote dilutionunder either section 2 or section 5-are not limited only to those
situations involving intentional discrimination. But the test for
actionable minority vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA encompasses elements that are substantially similar to the factors
set forth by the Supreme Court as relevant to determining the
presence of unconstitutional discrimination. In Rogers v. Lodge,
the Supreme Court held that a variety of factors were "relevant to
the issue of intentional discrimination,"76 including
lack of minority access to the candidate selection process, unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multimember or at-large districting, and the existence of past discrimination which precludes

74. See supratext accompanying notes 30-31.
75. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985). Hunter is particularly noteworthy because it establishes that a facially neutral and otherwise constitutionally
permissible voting law (there, a state felon disfranchisement law), is unconstitutional if it
was motivated by discriminatory intent. See id. at 223-24, 227-28.
76. 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982).
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effective participation in the elector process. Factors which enhance
the proof of voting dilution are the existence of large districts, antisingle-shot voting provisions, and the absence of any provision for atlarge candidates to run from geographic subdistricts.

All of these elements are encompassed within the list of factors
to prove statutory liability under section 2's results test (with the
overlapping factors emphasized in bold):
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in
the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the
members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision
has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the
members of the minority group have been denied access to
that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt
or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as
part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on
the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
78
voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

Thus, a statutory claim that is nominally based on dilutive effect rather than on discriminatory intent requires proof of the
very same factors that the Supreme Court has deemed probative

77. Id. at 619-20 n.8 (citations omitted) (citing Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297,
1305 (5th Cir. 1973)).
78. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting S.
REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07).

20131

MINORITY VOTE DILUTION

1061

of unconstitutional intent. 9 This connection to elements of intentionality was, for lack of a better word, intentional. In laying out
the factors for liability under section 2's results test, the Supreme
Court borrowed from a 1982 Senate Report. 0 The report, in listing factors that the Senate deemed relevant to section 2 liability,
in turn borrowed from a Fifth Circuit decision concerning circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent."'
Thus, although Congress adopted a nominal "results" test
which sought to ease the standard for bringing an actionable
claim under section 2 by eliminating the requirement that plaintiffs expressly allege discriminatory intent, the "results" test
leans heavily on "intent" evidence. Mere dilutive effect by itself is
insufficient. Additional factors that are essentially circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory animus are also necessary. The result,
therefore, is a test that in many ways mimics the test for intentional-and therefore unconstitutional-discrimination but which
avoids "placing local judges in the difficult position of labeling
their fellow public servants 'racists."'82 Dilutive schemes that vio79. See Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne:
The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39,
76 (2006) (describing how "intent remains an aspect of Section 2" liability). In fact, three
United States Courts of Appeals require that plaintiffs bringing claims under section 2
show that their injuries in some way stem from race-based decisionmaking. See Teague v.
Attala Cnty., 92 F.3d 283, 295 (5th Cir. 1996); Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983
(1st Cir. 1995); S. Christian Leadership Conference of Ala. v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281,
1293-94 (11th Cir. 1995).
80. Compare Rogers, 458 U.S. at 619-20 n.8, with S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982),
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
81. Compare Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305, with S. REP, No. 97-417, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
82. United States v. Blaine Cnty., 366 F.3d 897, 908 (9th Cir. 2004); see also The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-clearance:Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Pamela Karlan) ("[Olne of the reasons for the results
test in section 2 is to avoid the difficult problem of having to call people racists in order to
solve the exclusion of minorities from the political process. So when courts decide cases on
effects test reasons, they don't reach the question whether there is also a discriminatory
purpose. But let me tell you from my own experience that if we had to show discriminatory
purpose in lots of these cases, we could do it."); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36 (1982), reprinted
in 19892 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214 ("[Tlhe intent test is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire communities."). To be
clear, I am not suggesting that the statutory standard for vote dilution under section 2 is
identicalto the constitutional standard for intentional dilution under the Equal Protection
Clause. Section 2 undoubtedly proscribes a somewhat broader swath of conduct: that
which occupies space that lies somewhere between outright discriminatory intent and
mere disparate impact-where racial bias plays a decisive role in electoral outcomes, but
cannot necessarily be identified as the sole impetus behind an electoral arrangement. See,
e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 14, at 456 ("Section 2 prevents or compensates for a type of
constitutional violation that the courts cannot remedy through ordinary constitutional lit-
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late section 2 can therefore be understood in many instances as
implicating constitutional concerns about racial animus.
Second, if we accept the premise that the right to vote is best
understood as encompassing the right to aggregate one's vote
with others in order to participate meaningfully in the political
process," then dilutive arrangements essentially have the same
practical effect as outright denial of the ballot.
The Supreme Court has not yet clearly decided the issue of
whether schemes intended to dilute minority voting rights violate
the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that "[t]he right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race," 4 but it has
acknowledged that the right to vote "includes all action necessary
to make a vote effective." 5 Thus, the Court has held that "[t]he
right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well
as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot," the former of

igation: the election outcome that is unconstitutional owing to the racial basis for the electorate's verdict.").
83. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; see, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S.
320, 334 n.3 (2000) ("[W]e have never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth
Amendment."). Although a full discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope of this
short article, I note Justice Scalia's pronouncement that intentional efforts to dilute minority voting power lie outside the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibitions--or Congress's
authority to enforce those provisions-may be unfounded. The text of the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits not only the outright denial of the right to vote, but also the
abridgement of it. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. "Abridge" is defined as "[t]o reduce or diminish." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 7 (9th ed. 2009). That is precisely what a dilutive
scheme seeks to do to a person's right to vote. Moreover, pre-VRA Supreme Court precedent appears to establish the proposition that intentional dilution of minority voting power violates the Fifteenth Amendment. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) ('The
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or abridging a Negro's right to
vote.... If a State... weighted ...the white vote more heavily than the Negro vote, none
could successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable.") (emphasis added); see
also Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1973) (noting that electoral arrangements that "have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote ... are within the
ambit of [Section] 5 of the Voting Rights Act ... [which] is a permissible exercise of congressional power under [Section 2] of the Fifteenth Amendment"). Even City of Mobile v.
Bolden itself, from which much of the current confusion over this question stems, can be
read to hold that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits intentional minority vote dilution.
See 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960)) ("[A]llegations of a racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries stated
a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment."); cf. United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 552 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that in Bolden "a majority of the
court believe[d] that a fifteenth amendment claim can be made out against vote-diluting
at-large districting if discriminatory purpose is proved").
85. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1958 & Supp. I 1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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which "could therefore nullify [minority voters'] ability to elect
the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of
them from voting.""
If we accept the proposition that the right to vote entails more
than the act of casting a ballot, it seems clear that the injury occasioned by vote dilution should not be understood as less constitutionally significant than outright denial of the ballot. In a very
practical sense, dilutive schemes can render a person's vote
meaningless, just as surely as if the person had been denied the
ballot altogether.
III. VOTE DILUTION IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Of course, the mere fact that minority vote dilution is a serious
matter tells us nothing about whether it remains a pervasive
problem today or whether the costs of race-conscious redistricting
outweigh the benefits. That is, even if the critics too often fail to
grapple with the history of minority vote dilution and too easily
dismiss the significance of the injury it occasions, it is still fair to
ask whether this is largely a problem for our history books, and
whether the VRA's robust protections, which permit parties to
state a claim for minority dilution without raising allegations of
clear discriminatory intent, remain necessary today.
A. The PracticalNeed for Vote Dilution Doctrine in the TwentyFirst Century
1. Intentional Efforts to Dilute Minority Voting Power
It should go without saying that the country has witnessed
tremendous progress in the last few decades. Intentional efforts
to dilute minority voting power are likely less common today than
they were thirty or forty years ago. But we should resist the
temptation to think that the unfortunate history of efforts to intentionally discriminate against minority voters during the process of election line-drawing is no longer with us. In fact, we need
look no further than the current redistricting cycle, and in particular, the state of Texas's failure to obtain approval for any of its
three redistricting plans. In Texas v. United States, a three-judge

86. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
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panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia unanimously ruled that that two of Texas's three redistricting plansits congressional and state senate plans-had been enacted with
discriminatory purpose.8 7 Without reaching the question of discriminatory purpose with respect to Texas's third plan-its state
house plan-the Court found that the evidence "strongly suggest[ed]" that it, too, was tainted by discriminatory intent.88
With respect to the congressional redistricting plan, the panel
unanimously concluded that it was "enacted with discriminatory
purpose, 89 based on a number of factors. First, the court noted
that state officials had, in one district, "consciously replaced...
active Hispanic voters with low-turnout Hispanic voters," in order
to "reduce Hispanic voters' [voting power] without making it look
like anything in [the district] had changed," all "in an effort to
strengthen the voting power of [the district's] Anglo citizens."9 °
Notably, the district where this occurred-Congressional District
23-was the same district where, only six years earlier, Justice
Kennedy observed that Texas attempted to dilute Hispanic voting
power and thereby deprive Hispanic voters of an opportunity to
elect a candidate of their choice just as they "were about to exercise it," in a manner that bore "the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection violation."'"
Next, the court noted that "substantial surgery" had been performed on majority-minority districts, including the removal of
key economic centers, while nothing comparable had occurred in
majority white districts, and that this occurred without any plausible explanations.9 2 Third, the court pointed to departures from
the normal legislative process, such that "Black and Hispanic
members of Congress ...were excluded completely from the process of drafting new maps, while the preferences of Anglo members were frequently solicited and honored."9 3 Although the court
declined to address other evidence indicative of discriminatory intent, it pointedly noted that "[t]he parties have provided more ev-

87. No. 11-1303 (TBG-RMC-BAH), 2012 WL 3671924, at *18, *23-26 (D.D.C. Aug.
28, 2012).
88. Id. at *36-37.
89. Id. at*18.
90. Id. at *16.
91. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 438, 440 (2006).
92. Texas, 2012 WL 3671924, at *19-20.
93. Id. at *21.
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idence of discriminatory intent than we have space, or need, to
address here."94
Indeed, what was remarkable about the court's opinion is that
the court did not need to reach the issue of discriminatory intent
at all. Because a majority of the court ruled that Texas's congressional redistricting plan violated the VRA on other groundsnamely, section 5's effects or "retrogression" prong 5 5-the court
could have issued its ruling without addressing the question of
intent. The fact that all three members of the court reached this
issue as "an alternative, unanimous basis"96 for declaring the
Texas redistricting plan unlawful speaks volumes.
There really should not be much debate about whether we
should continue to prohibit redistricting plans that intentionally
dilute minority voting power or otherwise harm the interests of
minority voters. After all, such conduct violates, at a minimum,
the Equal Protection Clause. But because the VRA sweeps beyond
allegations of intentional discrimination to proscribe a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, we must still ask whether prohibitions
on redistricting plans that merely violate the statutory standard
for dilutive effect remain necessary.
2. The Stubborn Persistence of Racially Polarized Voting
One way to get at this question is to ask whether the conditions
that enable such dilutive schemes to succeed remain with us today. After all, efforts to dilute minority voting power can only
work against the backdrop of racial polarization. That is, it is only in a context where, among other things, minorities are consist-

94. Id. at *21 n.32. As noted, the court also found evidence of discriminatory intent
with respect to Texas's two other redistricting plans. With respect to Texas's Senate plan,
the court noted that: (i) without any explanation, the legislature cracked apart the African
American and Hispanic populations in one Senate district, distributing minority voters
among three separate districts where their voting power would be diluted and (ii) in a departure from typical redistricting practices, every Senator who represented a majorityminority district was excluded from the map-drawing process and was not permitted to
preview the maps. See id. at *23-24. Finally, with respect to House plan, the court blocked
its implementation on other grounds, but noted that it had "concern" about possible discriminatory intent, as the plan diluted minority voting power in four separate districts,
while Texas's mapdrawer provided "incredible testimony," explaining that these results
further "suggest[ed] [that] mapdrawers cracked [districts] along racial lines to dilute minority voting power." Id. at *36-37.
95. See id. at *17.
96. Id. at*18.
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ently outvoted by a white majority that policymakers can design
electoral arrangements that permit "those elected to ignore [miOnnority] interests without fear of political consequences ...
ly in such circumstances can one say that minority voters had
somehow been locked out of meaningful participation in the electoral process."
A relevant question, therefore, is to ask whether such conditions of polarization persist today. After all, contemporary critics
of minority vote dilution doctrine could concede that intentional
vote dilution is problematic because it is motivated by discriminatory animus, while still maintaining that results-based vote dilution protections are generally unnecessary because white voters
are purportedly willing in significant numbers to support minority or minority-preferred candidates.
It is undoubtedly true that, broadly speaking, white attitudes
towards minority office holding have improved tremendously
since 1965. Despite this progress, however, it is an unfortunate
fact that racial polarization continues to mark American political
life in many places. Indeed, while many hailed the election of
President Obama in 2008 as marking the beginning of a postracial era,99 the 2008 election was also notable for deepening racial polarization in some places. In fact, "the 2008 election did not
represent a fundamental shift in national patterns of race and
vote choice.... In the Deep South, Obama actually did worse
than Kerry among white voters."'0' This result was particularly
surprising, as "Obama's failure to improve over Kerry's margin
among whites" in certain parts of the country "stands out," given
the favorable conditions in 2008 for a Democratic candidate, including "[t]he economic collapse, the historic unpopularity of a
sitting Republican president, and an enormous fundraising ad-

97. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36; cf. Nw. Austin Mun.Util. Dist. No. One
v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 263 (2008) ("[A]s the Attorney General explains, racial
bloc voting is a necessary precondition for vote dilution ...").
99. For examples, see NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, "POST-RACIAL" AMERICA?
NOT YET 4 (2009), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publicationsfPost-RacialAmerica-Not-Yet.pdf.
100. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2010)
(emphasis added); see also Kristen Clarke, The Obama Factor: The Impact of the 2008
PresidentialElection on Future Voting Rights Act Litigation, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 59,
68-70 & tbl. 1 (2009).

1067

MINORITY VOTE DILUTION

2013]

vantage."'' Moreover, this decline among white support cannot be
explained by partisan affiliation; in 2008, Obama did seven points
worse than John Kerry did in 2004 among white voters in the
states covered by section 5 of the VRA.'0
As of the time of this writing, comprehensive data regarding
the 2012 presidential election is not yet available on a state-bystate basis, but a few data points are available. We know that,
nationally, voting in the 2012 presidential election was more polarized along racial lines than it was in 2008, with Obama winning a smaller share of white voters, leading USA Today to proclaim on its front page the morning after the election: "A Nation
Moving Further Apart.' 0 3
Twenty-nine state-by-state exit polls provided by CNN illustrate substantial variance in the degree of racial polarization
around the country as demonstrated in the following table:
CNN STATE-BY-STATE EXIT POLLS

State

Percent of White
Vote for Obama

01 4

Percent of Black
Vote for Obama

Alabama

15%

95%

Arizona

32%

Not Available

California

45%

96%

Florida

37%

95%

Illinois

46%

96%

Indiana

38%

89%

101. Ansolabehere et al., supranote 100, at 1414.
102. See id.; see also Clarke, supra note 100, at 75-76.
103. See Page, supra note 5. Exit poll data indicated that Obama won "more than nine
of 10" African American votes, improved his margin among Hispanics to 69% and Asian
Americans to 73%, but lost ground among whites winning only 40% of their votes. Id.; Exit
Polls, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USPOOpI (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013) (noting Obama won 62% of the Asian American vote in 2008); President:
Full Results, CNN, http://www.cnn.comlelection/2012/results/race/president (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013) (noting Obama won 73% of the Asian American vote in 2012).
104. All data is compiled from the CNN Election Center's data on the 2012 Presidential
Election. To access each state's individual data, visit President:Full Results, supra note
103, and select the specific state under the "results for" drop down tab on the left. When
taken to the specific state's page, select the "Exit Polls" tab.
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POLLS
CNN STATE-BY-STATE EXIT
State

Percent of White
Vote for Obama

Percent of Black
Vote for Obama

Iowa

51%

Not Available

Kansas

33%

Not Available

Maine

57%

Not Available

Maryland

43%

97%

Massachusetts

57%

92%

Michigan

44%

95%

Minnesota

48%

Not Available

Mississippi

10%

96%

Missouri

32%

94%

Montana

38%

Not Available

Nevada

43%

92%

New Hampshire

51%

Not Available

New Jersey

43%

96%

New Mexico

41%

Not Available

New York

49%

94%

North Carolina

31%

96%

Ohio

41%

96%

Oregon

54%

Not Available

Pennsylvania

42%

93%

Vermont

66%

Not Available

Virginia

37%

93%

Washington

53%

Not Available

Wisconsin

48%

94%
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A careful analysis of these figures will of course seek to control
for a range of factors.' But a few points immediately stick out.
First, racial polarization persists in many parts of the country.
Second, such polarization remains extremely severe in certain
pockets. For instance, there are four states that are covered in
whole under section 5 of the VRA that are found in the table
above: Alabama, Arizona, Mississippi, and Virginia. Obama received the support of only 10% of white voters in Mississippi and
only 15% of white voters in Alabama. Regardless of partisan affiliation, these numbers indicate stark racial polarization in those
two states. Obama's best showing among white voters in those
states was in Virginia, where he only received only 37% of white
voters.
Furthermore, presidential elections have some unique characteristics and may therefore feature diminished levels of racial polarization when compared to state and local elections in the same
area. °6 This suggests that overall racial polarization may actually
be worse than the presidential electing data would indicate.
In other words, despite tremendous progress in racial attitudes
since the enactment of the VRA in 1965, substantial differences
persist between the electoral preferences of white voters and African American voters, and these differences are severe in certain
parts of the country. To be sure, there may be more places in the
country than ever before where minority voters could elect their
preferred candidates without having the benefit of a majorityminority district. We should not be blind to that fact, which
should be reflected in our application and interpretation of the
VRA. It may be appropriate to rely on "crossover" districts-in
which a small group of white voters support minoritycandidates-to satisfy the need for minority representation. 01 7
But, as Justice Kennedy recently observed, "racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history. Much
remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal
opportunity to share and participate in our democratic processes

105. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 100, at 1416-19 (explaining controls for partisan skews in analysis of 2004 and 2008 presidential data).
106. See Clarke, supra note 100, at 76-81. Analyzing vote dilution claims always requires a close focus on the particulars of an individual case, and racial polarization patterns may differ from place to place, and depending on the size of the jurisdiction or election district at issue. See id.
107. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24 (2009).
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and traditions. . . ."1 Given the persistence of severe racial polarization, it remains the case that, at least in some places, minority
voters will only be able to elect their preferred candidates from
majority-minority districts. In such places, majority-minority districts remain an important means to provide minority voters with
a meaningful opportunity to participate in the political process.
B. Costs and Benefits: The Risk of Balkanization
It is possible, however, that reliance on such districts exacts
some costs, in the form of balkanizing the electorate. Those concerned with the purportedly polarizing effects of race-conscious
districting tend to raise at least three distinct concerns: (1) that
dividing voters among racial lines inappropriately reproduces
race as an organizing principle of civic life;" 9 (2) that majorityminority districts are particularly (left-leaning) voters from surrounding districts, tilting those districts farther to the right than
they might otherwise be, increasing division and polarization
among the overall electorate." °
With respect to the first concern that race-conscious districting
reproduces race as an organizing principle, it is difficult if not
impossible to measure empirically what effect the use of raceconscious remedies has on the level of race-consciousness in society generally. Rather than something measurable, this seems to
be a largely philosophical objection stemming from a discomfort
with race-conscious remedies per se, based on the expressive
harm that such remedies purportedly incur. While the danger
that the race-conscious remedies reify racial divisions should be
taken seriously, the concern about race-consciousness in the redistricting context omits the fact that statutory claims for minority vote dilution can only be brought-and majority-minority districting can only be required-in contexts where racial
polarization is already present."' That is, it is only in situations

108. See id. at 25.
109. For an expression of this view, see Justice Thomas's opinion in Holder v. Hall. 512
U.S. 874, 905 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647
(1993)) (arguing that majority-minority districting "systematically divid[es] the country
into electoral districts along racial lines-an enterprise of segregating the races into political homelands that amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of 'political apartheid"').
110. See supra text accompanying note 43.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
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where the electorate is already effectively balkanized along racial
lines where a plaintiff can claim that his voting rights have been
diluted in some sense, such that the drawing of a majorityminority district may be required by the VRA. Majority-minority
districting is not-indeed, it cannot be-the initial cause of polarization, since such districting can only be required where such polarization has already been observed.
Thus, when Abigail Thernstrom observes that "only five members of the [Congressional Black Caucus] . . .have been elected
from majority-White constituencies, and only two are Republicans," 112 and from this fact draws the conclusion that majorityminority districting is the cause of polarization, she may have
mistaken cause for effect. That is, persistent racial polarization
may be precisely the reason why so few minority candidates have
found success in majority-white districts.
While it is absolutely correct to observe that nearly all African
American members of Congress have been elected from majorityAfrican American districts, the inverse of that fact is that very
few majority-white districts have ever elected African American
representatives. As of 2006 (when section 5 of the VRA was last
reauthorized), only 49 of 8047 elections-0.61%-in whitemajority U.S. House districts had provided black winners since
1966."' And while the country has elected its first African American president, three states that have among the highest African
American populations in the country-Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina-have never elected an African American to
any statewide office."' Instead of lamenting the fact that so many
minority members of Congress represent majority-minority constituencies, perhaps we should instead be troubled by the fact
that so many majority-white districts have never elected a minority legislator.
The second concern that majority-minority districts reward extremist candidates has mixed empirical support at best. In fact,
the actual experience in such jurisdictions suggests the opposite,
because in districts where minorities constitute a modest majori-

112. Thernstrom, supranote 12, at 412.
113. Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act's Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives
and Views from the Field: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights &
PropertyRights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. at 184 (2006).
114. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 33 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 636.
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ty, white voters develop an "incentive[] to collaborate with segments of the minority community and to coalesce behind... 'newstyle' minority candidates, who assiduously court both white and
minority voters."'' To adopt the contrary conclusion in the face of
substantial empirical evidence-namely, to assert without more
than anecdotal evidence that majority-African American districts
will generally favor candidates who pander to racial resentments-would be to assume that African American voters are a
far-left monolith, rather than a group featuring some ideological
diversity. Indeed, it is frequently the case that "a centrist coalition of moderate white and black voters [have] the power to elect
the black candidate of their choice in many [majority-African
American] districts." 6
The third concern that majority-minority districting may
bleach surrounding districts of minority influence, ultimately
harming minority voters' substantive interests is perhaps the
most troubling. There is indeed some research indicating that, in
many circumstances, the drawing of majority-minority districts
tends to "bleach" neighboring districts of minority voters, rendering those districts whiter and more conservative. Thus, some
have therefore posited that drawing majority-minority districts,
while enhancing "descriptive" representation for minority voters
by enabling the election of more minority candidates, harms "substantive" representation for such voters by reducing the total
number of electeds who sympathize with minority voters' policy
goals."7 From the perspective of minority voters, it may instead
be better to distribute minority voters across a larger range of
districts where they can hope to wield greater influence.
This may be true in some circumstances and warrants some
concern. But I note three caveats. First, these concerns are less
valid in circumstances involving high racial polarization. For example, if we assume perfect polarization, then the relative proportion of white to minority voters is irrelevant at levels that are
either below or above a 50% threshold of the electorate in actual
turnout. That is, in a context in which all white voters prefer one

115. Elmendorf, supra note 14, at 398 (quoting DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING
AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS
128 (1999)).
116. See CANON, supra note 115, at 3.
117. See SWAIN, supra note 43, at 210; Cameron et al., supra note 43, at 794.
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candidate, while all minority voters prefer another, it makes no
difference if the district is drawn to be 51% white or 90% whitein either scenario, minority voters will be locked out of the process. In such circumstances, draining minority voters from surrounding districts will have no effect-or even influence--on outcomes in those districts.
Of course, conditions of perfect polarization are almost never
observed. Where racial polarization has diminished significantly,
minority voters' interests may be best served by districting plans
that enhance influence of minority voters. But influence is a nebulous concept. And significant or even extreme polarization-with
almost 90% of whites favoring one candidate and 90% of minorities favoring another-does still occur, as it did during the 2012
presidential election in Alabama and Mississippi.11 s In contexts of
substantial polarization (let alone extreme polarization), concerns
about diminishing minority influence in surrounding districts are
largely unfounded.
Second, the concern that descriptive representation trades-off
with substantive representation is, at best, a caution about the
possible partisan consequences of majority-minority districting
(i.e., it may make it more difficult for white Democrats to prevail
in neighboring districts). But this tells us nothing about whether
the drawing of majority-minority districts causes voting patterns
to actually become more polarized along raciallines as a result of
the drawing of majority-minority districts. And, in fact, the "consistent" finding among political scientists is that majorityminority districting may soften racial polarization among the
electorate because "the election of out-group candidates tends to
reduce biased voting by members of the in-group and to diminish
negative stereotyping of the out-group. '1 9
Third, although it is tempting to ascribe growing partisan polarization in our politics to the line-drawing process, in part because redistricting has come to be viewed as an ugly example of
self-dealing by entrenched politicians, there actually appears to

118. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
119. Elmendorf, supra note 14, at 397 & n.97 (discussing empirical political science
work in this area). Even Abigail Thernstrom has noted anecdotal evidence of this point.
See Thernstrom, supra note 12, at 376 n.9 (recounting that "numerous White legislators
expressed astonishment at the change in racial attitudes for which the passage of the Voting Rights Act was responsible").
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be little empirical evidence to support that claim. 120 For example,
it is certainly true that, broadly speaking, election districts have
become more homogeneous, that competition within districts has
declined, and that districts have become more ideologically polarized when compared to each other, such that the percentage of
districts that can be considered "safe" seats for both Democrats
and Republicans has increased. 12 1 But Senate races have also become less competitive, and voting patterns at the county level
have also become more homogeneous, suggesting that other factors such as geographic self-sorting among like-minded voters
may be at play. 2 Moreover, in the aggregate, the voting patterns
of officials elected from competitive districts are little different
from those elected from "safe" seats. 123 Partisan polarization
seems to have increased everywhere and at all levels, not simply
where the VRA has been at work.
In fact, the decline in electoral competition within particular
districts has not correlated with more significant ideological polarization, which "appears to be a longer-term phenomenon whose
origins predate" recent redistricting cycles.' 24 Moreover, recent research employing comprehensive computerized redistricting simulations demonstrates that efforts to create districts randomly
(i.e., race-blind) would not significantly reduce overall partisan
polarization (but would decrease minority representation); conversely, maximizing minority representation by drawing as many
majority-minority districts as possible would not increase such
polarization significantly.2 5 All of this suggests that the composition of the electorate in a given district may not be the best pre-

120. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 307-08 (2011).
121. See id. at 308-10.
122. See id. at 311-13.
123. See id. at 314.
124. Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?,53 AM. J. OF
POL. Sci. 666, 672-73 (2009); see also Harry J. Enten, Why "Gerrymandering"Doesn't Polarise Congress the Way We're Told, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/an/O3/gerrymandering-polarise-congress (citing "wellestablished political science literature" establishing that "even when controlling for district partisanship, there are increasing ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans in Congress"); Nate Silver, As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House
Stand?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.
comI2012/12/27/as-swing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand
(concluding that
empirical data indicates that ideological polarization has increased substantially "above
and beyond any changes brought about by redistricting").
125. See McCarty et al., supra note 124, at 673-79.
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dictor for how centrist or ideologically extremist the district's
elected representative might be. The causes of recent hyperpartisan polarization seem to lie somewhere else than in the linedrawing process.'2 6
Ultimately a conclusive evaluation of these empirical claims is
beyond my limited expertise. But it appears that there is little
empirical evidence to support the notion that breaking up minority-minority districts would somehow diminish racial or even partisan polarization, it is the persistence of racial polarization that
necessitates the remedy of race-conscious districting in the first
place.
CONCLUSION

The sheer growth of the non-white population and its attendant gains in voting power raise some significant challenges
for the minority vote dilution doctrine. Where substantial racial
polarization remains a feature of electoral life, however, such districts remain necessary to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. But in places where racial polarization has declined substantially, critics of minority
vote dilution doctrine have raised valid questions as to whether
majority-minority districts remain necessary in order to provide
minority voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.
In circumstances where racial polarization has waned but still
persists to a lesser degree, legislatures and courts could be encouraged to draw something less than majority-minority districts,
so long as such districts preserved the minority community's ability to elect candidates of its choice.
To acknowledge this point is not to concede that majorityminority districting has become wholly irrelevant-rather, it is to
acknowledge the progress that we have made without denying
that the old medicine remains necessary in many parts of the
country.

126. See Pildes, supra note 120, at 314-15. It may simply be the case, as Richard Pildes
has argued, that the growing polarization that we are witnessing in our politics today is
simply part of America's development into a "mature" two-party democracy. Id. at 288. He
argues this is due in part to the fact that the VRA transformed the South from a region of
one-party rule, and that, once two parties had to compete for votes in the South, a new dynamic emerged whereby the parties became more ideologically pure at the national level.
See id. at 293-94.

.

UNITEDST TES
Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation
POSTLSERVICE. (All Periodicals Publications Except Requester Publications)

University of Richmond Law Review 314 1 1

TV P P_41
Y11
10/l/2012

SQuarterly

4

$35-00

we~apton WayAnrwTns
University of Richmond, VA 23173-0001 000-I___
44

(8041 2.89.123_

28 Westhampton Way
University of Richmond, VA 23173-0001

Joe Christensen, Inc.
1.0. Box 81269, Lincoln NE 68501
rank
b,
itor-in-Chief, University of Richmond Law Review
28 Westhampton Way
University of Richmond, VA 23173-0001
Tndrew larne, Managing Editor, University of Richmond Law Review
28 Westhampton Way
Universitv of Richmond, VA 22173-001

University of Richmond

!8 Westhampton Way

School of Law

University of Richmond, VA 23273

r.

01.

0013

0,0

volume 46, NO. 4, May 2012

Unvesty of Richond Law Review

494

&1J104
004 104650
50114,010404

01

.. .
b, P Iw
c
I

~

mmwSPs F
1Ap
s-

&

Ok,4C O0

.. .. .

~

0,043
3501000

~

~

0Ml

P
4(0014

.....
....

.............

005010m~U'

..(~ Z.
.04

0.3

10..03.0.030101000403.4036500
,4940
P

.

A1

02.1

5650
oCs
0,4lauooa~~8

r

00

404

494___ _

~

0.1*00 05.030C

*05100

0

003 00
slo
o. (900,050,00I

(00*0650

~~

366

525

~

~

00040410.0003

2012______

PS-35260.Aw00*150000w=52I1aoeeo..0~e0

~

929

90.6

ii

ANNOUNCEMENT

We have acquired the
entire back stock and
reprint rights of

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

LAW REVIEW

Complete sets to date
are now available. We
can also furnish single
volumes and issues.

WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
1285 MAIN STREET
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14209

iv

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

LAW REVIEW
2012-2013

VOLUME 47

EDITORIAL BOARD
FRANK TALBOTT

Editor-in-Chief
ROBERT S. CLAIBORNE, JR.

Executive Editor
TRACEY A. THERET

CLINT A. NICHOLS

Annual Survey Editor

Allen ChairEditor

ANDREW E. TARNE

SIMONE T. RAEss

Managing Editor

Lead Articles Editor
MAGGIE A. BOWMAN

Senior Notes & Comments Editor
MANUSCRIPTS EDITORS

SUSAN P. DEBUSK
RICHARD D. PALMIERI

M. WEST AILSWORTH
MARY GRACE MILLER

DAVID

N.

GUSTIN

RACHEL L. YATES

ARTICLES EDITORS

J.

MCKENZIE CARSON
PATRICK McNICHOL

ELIZABETH S.
JOSEPH P.

KATHLEEN GREENE

CHAPMAN

CLAIRE

SMITH

E.

ZELMANSKI

ARTICLES & COMMENTS EDITORS
LAURA E. BOORMAN
ELIZABETH C.

MARIUM DuRRANI
BROOKS H. SPEARS

SOUTHALL
SENIOR STAFF

KELLY J. BUNDY
CHARISSE L. HINES

GEOFFREY A. EASTON
PAUL T. ROBERTSON

CONOR J. DEVINE
LAURA A. PERILLO
ERIC J. WALLACE

STAFF
GEORGE GRAY III

TIM ARCHER

EMILY MONSKE
RYAN MURPHY

CHRIS BASCOM

CHRISTIAN HAINES

CLARK BELOTE

KENDALL HAMILTON

ASHLEY PETERSON

MARK BURGIN

JULIE HOFFMEISTER

JULIA I. RENEHAN

W. THOMAS CHAPPELL
KATHERINE COLLINS
AMANDA CONNER
JEFF EINHAUS

LATOSHA

M.

ELLIS

SAMANTHA FANT

ROBERT

J. FARLOW
JOHN G. DOUGLASS
CARL W. TOBIAS

Faculty Advisors

ZACH JESSE

CALEB ROUTHIER

NATHAN KRAMER

SUZANNE SPILLER

CAROLINE LAMBERTI

IAN SPREAT

STEPHANIE MARTINEZ

JONATHAN TAN

KATHERINE MAXWELL
BRITNEY MCPHERON

BENJAMIN WILLS

ADAM TATE
MELISSA WRIGHT

GLENICE B. COOMBS

Legal Publication
Coordinator

Editorial Policy
The University of Richmond Law Review seeks to preserve the author's writing
style when editing articles selected for publication. Each author is given the opportunity to review his or her article prior to its publication.
Furthermore, the Law Review strives to promote an open and close working relationship with authors of articles selected for publication. To this end, the Law Review
will maintain regular correspondence to update authors on the progress of their articles, as well as to resolve any problems that may occur during editing.
Submissions
The Law Review welcomes submissions year round on all legal topics. The Lead
Articles Editor reviews each submission. The Lead Articles Editor and the Editor-inChief make offers of publication, taking into consideration quality and substance,
among other factors.
University of Richmond Law Review
University of Richmond, Virginia 23173
Phone: (804) 289-8216
Fax: (804) 287-6438
E-mail: lawreviewCarichmond.edu
Please visit our website at:
http://lawreview.richmond.edu/

The University of Richmond Law Review (ISSN 0566-2389) (USPS 342-410) is published four times a year by students of the University of Richmond Law School. Subscription rate is $35.00 per year; single issues of The Annual Survey of Virginia Law
are available at $20.00 per copy; other single issues are available at $15.00 per copy.
Subscriptions are automatically renewed unless a written request for cancellation is
received prior to publication of the first issue of the volume. Periodical postage paid at
Richmond, Virginia, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address
changes to the University of Richmond Law Review, University of Richmond, Virginia
23173.
Copyright © 2013 by University of Richmond Law Review Association. Except as otherwise provided, the author of each article in this issue has granted permission for
copies of that article to be made available for classroom use, provided that (1) the
copies are distributed at below cost, (2) the author and the University of Richmond
Law Review are identified, (3) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy, and
(4) the University of Richmond Law Review is notified of the use.
Back issues of Volumes l'through 46 may be obtained from:
William S. Hein and Co., Inc., 1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209-1987.

OFFICERS OF INSTRUCTION AND ADMINISTRATION
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
SCHOOL OF LAW
Administration
Edward L. Ayers, B.A., M.A., Ph.D ........ President of the University of Richmond
Dean and Professor of Law
Wendy C. Perdue, B.A., J.D ..........................
W. Clark Williams, Jr., B.A., J.D .... Associate Dean of Academics, Professor of Law
Associate Dean for
Kristine M. Henderson, B.A., J.D ............................
Student Services and Administration
Associate Dean, Library and
Timothy L. Coggins, B.A., M.S., J.D .................
Information Services and Professor of Law
Associate Dean of Career Services
Janet D. Hutchinson, B.S., J.D .................
Associate Dean of Admissions
Michelle Rahman ................................
Faculty
Vice President and Provost
Stephen Allred, B.A., M.P.A., J.D., Ed.D ...............
Clinical Professor of Law and
Margaret I. Bacigal, B.A., J.D ......................
Administrative Director, Clinical Placement Program
Professor of Law
Ronald J. Bacigal, B.S., LL.B ..................................
Professor of Law, Emeritus
W. Wade Berryhill, B.S., J.D., LL.M ...................
Professor of Law
Carol N. Brown, A.B., LL.M., J.D ..............................
W. Hamilton Bryson, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D ........ Blackstone Professor of Law
Jurist in Residence
The Hon. Senior Justice Harry L. Carrico, B.A., J.D., LL.D ....
Director of Pro Bono Services
Tara L. Casey, B.A., J.D ............................
Associate Clinical Professor of Law
Dale Margolin Cecka, B.A., J.D ...............
and Director of the Family Law Clinic
Professor of Law
Henry L. Chambers, B.A., J.D .................................
Professor of Law
Christopher A. Cotropia, B.S., J.D ..............................
Professor of Law, Emeritus
............
Carle E. Davis, C.P.A ................
Professor of Law
John G. Douglass, B.A., J.D ...................................
Professor of Law
Joel B. Eisen, B.S., J.D ........................................
Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills
Tamar R. S. Eisen, B.A., J.D ..............
and Director, Lawyering Skills I & II
Allen Professor of Law
David G. Epstein, B.A., LL.M., LL.B .......................
Associate Professor of Law
Jessica M. Erickson, B.A., J.D ........................
Associate Professor of Law
William 0. Fisher, A.B., J.D., M.P.P ...................
Professor of Law
David Frisch, B.S., J.D., LL.M .................................
Professor of Law
......................
James Gibson, B.A., J.D ................
and Director of the Intellectual Property Institute
Assistant
Chiara Giorgetti, Laurea in Giurisprudenza, M.Sc, LL.M., J.S.D ........
Professor of Law
Assistant Professor of Law
Meredith J. Harbach, B.A., J.D .......................
Professor of Law
Mary L. Heen, B.A., M.A.T., J.D., LL.M .........................
Professor of Law, Emeritus
Azizah Y. al-Hibri, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D ..............
Professor of Law
Ann C. Hodges, B.S., M.A., J.D ................................
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Melanie C. Holloway, B.A., J.D ...............
Professor of Law, Emeritus
J. Rodney Johnson, B.A., J.D., LL.M., C.L.U .........
Professor of Law
John P. Jones, B.A., J.D., LL.M ................................
Professor of Law
Corinna B. Lain, B.A., J.D .....................................
John Marshall
The Hon. Hannah M. Lauck, A.B., J.D ............................
Professor of Judicial Studies
Professor of Law
Alberto B. Lopez, M.S., J.D., J.S.M .............................
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Julie E. McConnell, B.A., J.D .................
and Director of the Children's Defense .Clinic
Professor of Law, Emeritus
Andr6 A. Moenssens, J.D., LL.M ......................
Professor of Law
Shari Motro, B.A., J.D ........................................
Professor of Law, Emeritus
Daniel T. Murphy, B.A., J.D., LL.M ................
Professor of Law
Kristen R. Osenga, J.D., M.S., B.S.E ...........................

John R. Pagan, A.B., M.Litt., J.D., D.Phil ....................
John F. Preis, B.S., J.D ..............................
Emmeline Paulette Reeves, B.A., J.D ..................

University Professor
Associate Professor of Law
Associate Professor of Law
for Academic Success
Kimberly J. Robinson, B.A., J.D ................................
Professor of Law
Noah M. Sachs, B.A., J.D., M.P.A .........
Professor of Law and Faculty Director,
Merhige Center in Environmental Law
Andrew B. Spalding, B.A., J.D., Ph.D ..................
Assistant Professor of Law
Jonathan K. Stubbs, B.A., B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.T.S ............
Professor of Law
Peter N. Swisher, B.A., M.A., J.D ..............................
Professor of Law
Mary Tate, B.A., J.D ..........................
Director of the Richmond Institute
for Actual Innocence
Carl W. Tobias, B.A., LL.B ...........................
Williams Professor of Law
Adrienne E. Volenik, B.A., J.D .................
Clinical Professor of Law Director,
Education Rights Clinic
Margaret A. Walker, B.A., J.D .......................
Visiting Assistant Professor
for Academic Success
Kevin C. Walsh, A.B., M.A., J.D .......................
Associate Professor of Law
Library Faculty
Paul M. Birch, B.A., M.A.L.S., J.D ................
Computer Services Librarian
Heather E. Casey, B.A., M.S., J.D ...... Reference and Research Services Librarian
Suzanne B. Corriell, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S .... Head, Reference and Research Services
Joyce Manna Janto, B.S., M.L.S., J.D ............................
Deputy Director
Amy L. O'Connor, B.A., M.L.S .......................
Digital Resources Librarian
Sally H. Wambold, B.A., M.S.L.S ....................
Technical Services Librarian
Andrew M. Winston, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S ..............
Research and Instructional
Services Librarian
Gail F. Zwirner, B.A., M.S.L.S ............................
Head, Access Services
Adjunct Faculty
Hugh E. Aaron, B.S., M.H.A., J.D .............
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
John Adams, B.A., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Farhad Aghdami, B.A., J.D., LL.M ...........
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
The Hon. Michael Allen, B.A., M.A., J.D ................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Tessie Bacon, B.S., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Katherine B. Bain, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Edward D. Barnes, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
David E. Boelzner, B.A., M.A., J.D ...........
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Kevin Bennardo, B.A., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor Law
William Benos, LL.B., J.D .............................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Robert Best, B.A., J.D ........................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
S. Virginia Bondurant, B.A., J.D ..............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Thomas 0. Bondurant, Jr., B.A., J.D .........
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Claudia Brand, First Legal State Examination (Germany), Second Legal
State Examination (Germany), J.D .......
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
The Hon. Lynn S. Brice, B.A., M.S.W., J.D ..............
Adjunct Professor of Law
Craig M. Burshem, B.S., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Jack W. Burtch, Jr., B.A., J.D .........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Claire Cardwell, B.A., J.D .............................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Michael P. Chiffolo, B.A., J.D .................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Christopher Collins, B.A., J.D ..........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Nancy D. Cook, B.S., J.D .....................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
James C. Cosby, B.A., J.D .............................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Eden Darrell, B.S., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Ashley Davis, B.A., J.D ......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Marla G. Decker, B.A., J.D ............................
Adjunct Professor of Law
William J. Dinkin, B.A., J.D .................. Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Morna P. Ellis, M.Ed., J.D ....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law

Andrea S. Erard, B.A., J.D .................
Stephen Faraci, B.A., J.D ..................
Bennett J. Fidlow, B.F.A., J.D., M.F.A.........
D. Hayden Fisher, B.A., J.D ................

Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct

Associate
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant

Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor

of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law

Jacqueline Ford, B.A., J.D ....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Norman J. Geller, B.S., M.S., Ph.D ................
Adjunct Educational Specialist
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Frederick R. Gerson, B.A., J.D ................
Michael Gill, B.A., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Paul G. Gill, B.A., J.D .......................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Michael L. Goodman, B.A., J.D ........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Carolyn V. Grady, B.A., J.D ...........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Timothy H. Guare, B.A., J.D ...........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Steven M. Haas, B.A., J.D ....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Sarah J. Hallock, B.A., J.D ...................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Patrick R. Hanes, B.A., J.D ...................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Michael N. Herring, B.A., J.D .................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Robert L. Hodges, B.A., J.D ............................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Carlos L. Hopkins, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Melissa Hoy, B.A., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
The Hon. Henry E. Hudson, B.A., J.D ................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Carlos Hopkins, B.A., J.D ....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Vernon E. Inge, B.A., J.D .....................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
John C. Ivins, Jr., B.A., J.D ................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Herndon Jeffreys III, B.A., J.D ........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Caroline Jennings, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
David J. Johnson, B.A., J.D ...................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Randall Johnson, Jr., B.A., J.D .............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Jessica Sanders Jones, B.A., M.L.S., J.D .......
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Phyllis C. Katz, B.A., MURP, J.D ............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Laura W. Khatcheressian, B.A., J.D ...........
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Anna M. King, B.A., J.D .....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Mary E. Langer, B.A., J.D ....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Mary E. Maguire, B.A., J.D ...................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Courtney M. Malveaux, B.A., M.A., J.D ........
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Bruce Matson, B.A., J.D ......................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Steven C. McCallum, B.A., J.D ................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
James M. McCauley, B.A., J.D ...............
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Kathleen M. McCauley, B.A., J.D ............
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Patricia C. McCullough, B.S., J.D............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
James V. Meath, B.A., M.U.A., J.D ............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Stephen Miller, B.A., J.D .....................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Dale G. Mullen, B.A., B.S., J.D ..............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Nancy V. Oglesby, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Hillary A. Peet, B.A., J.D .....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Jayne A. Pemberton, B.A., M.A., J.D .........
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
James Phillips, B.A., J.D., Ph.D ........................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Cortland Putbrese, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Geetha Ravindra, B.A., J.D ...................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
James Rigler, B.S., J.D .......................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Elizabeth Riopelle, B.A., J.D ..................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Elizabeth G. Robertson, B.A., J.D ............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
John V. Robinson, B.A., B.L., J.D ......................
Adjunct Professor of Law
The Hon. Frederick G. Rockwell III, B.A., J.D ...........
Adjunct Professor of Law
Thomas P. Rohman, B.B.A., J.D .......................
Adjunct Professor of Law
Randy B. Rowlett, B.A., J.D ................
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
Mark Rubin, B.A., J.D ....................
A.L. Philpott Adjunct Professor of Law
Doron Samuel-Siegel, B.A., J.D .............
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Cornelia Savage, B.S., J.D ....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Cullen Seltzer, B.A., J.D .....................
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
The Hon. Beverly W. Snukals, B.A., J.D ..............
Adjunct Professor of Law

James M. Snyder, B.A., J.D ...................
Scott Stovall, B.S., J.D .......................
Lindsey Stravitz, B.A., M.L.A., J.D ............
John Thomas, B.A., J.D ......................
Tracey Thorne-Begland, B.A., J.D .............
Brent M. Timberlake, B.A., J.D ...............
Ian D. Titley, B.S., J.D .......................
Stephen J. van Stempvoort, B.A., M.A., J.D ...
Robert J. Wagner, B.A., J.D ...............
Kristin P. Walinski, B.A., J.D .................
Michelle Welch, B.A., J.D .....................
Thomas Wolfe, B.A., J.D ..................

Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct
Adjunct

Associate
Assistant
Assistant
Associate
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Associate
Assistant
Assistant
Associate

Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor
Professor

LAW REVIEW ADVISORY BOARD
FAITH A. ALEJANDRO
PAMELA B. BECKNER
STEVEN D. BENJAMIN
J. EDWARD BETTS
M. DENISE MELTON CARL
JAMES B. COMEY
RICHARD CULLEN
JOHN P. CUNNINGHAM
ELIZABETH F. EDWARDS

PATRICK M. MCSWEENEY
BARRY T. MEEK
PETER M. MELLETTE
Louis A. MEZZULLO
WILLARD J. MOODY, SR.
JON A. MUELLER
CARL E. OMOHUNDRO, JR.
LAURENCE V. PARKER, JR.
J. WAVERLY PULLEY, III
JoHN D. Epps
MARGUERITE R. RUBY
DEBORAH LOVE FIELD
C. RANDOLPH SULLIVAN
LAURA G. Fox
WILLIAM A. WALSH, JR.
SCOTT J. GOLIGHTLY
PRESTON D. WIGNER
J. RODNEY JOHNSON
W. CLARK WILLIAMS, JR.
THOMAS S. WORD, JR.

of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law
of Law

